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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
BETTY JEAN WARREN and 
GOICOECHEA LAW OFFICE, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, UNISYS AND NATIONAL 
UNION FIRE INSURANCE CO., 
Defendants/Respondents. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS 
UNISYS AND NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE CO. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I. Whether the Industrial Commission correctly concluded, 
as a factual matter, that substantial evidence supports the 
conclusions that: (A) the circumstances of this case did not 
justify a contingent fee; (B) $1,000 is a reasonable attorney's 
fee for the services rendered; and (C) any amount withheld in 
excess of $1,000 should be paid over to Respondents? 
II. Whether this Court should assume the correctness of the 
Judgment below based upon Appellants1 complete failure to: (1) 
reference the Record on Appeal to support its factual conten-
tions; and (2) timely raise its contentions before the Industrial 
Commission? 
Case No. 890365-CA 
(Argument Priority No. 6) 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE AND CASE AUTHORITY 
The determinative case authority is Lanier v. Pvne, 29 Utah 
2d 249, 508 P.2d 38 (1973). See Addendum "A." The determinative 
statutory provision is Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-62. See Addendum 
"B." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
Plaintiffs/Appellants Betty Jean Warren ("Warren'1) and 
Goicoechea Law Office ("Goicoechea") (referred to collectively as 
"Appellants") sought Industrial Commission approval of attorneys' 
fees arising out of a contingent fee contract allegedly entered 
between Goicoechea and Warren's husband for the purpose of 
recovering damages in a third party claim brought on behalf of 
Warren for industrial injuries she sustained in an automobile 
accident. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition by the Industrial 
Commission. 
1. On August 21, 1987, Warren, through her counsel, 
Goicoechea Law Office, petitioned the Industrial Commission of 
Utah for approval of attorneys' fees, relative to obtaining 
insurance policy limits in a third party claim for which the 
liability insurance carrier never denied liability. (R. at 4-6 
and 56-59.) 
2. At a hearing conducted by Administrative Law Judge 
Richard G. Sumsion on October 19, 1987, the respective parties 
presented arguments concerning the reasonableness of the 
attorneys' fee claimed by Appellants. (R. at 12-13.) (See also 
Transcript of Industrial Commission Hearing at p. 33:1-6.) 
3. On October 29, 1987, Judge Sumsion entered his "Order 
Approving Attorneys Fees," which contains the following factual 
determinations: 
(a) Goicoechea had only expended five hours of time in 
obtaining the third party settlement for which liability was 
accepted by both the auto liability carrier and the Worker's 
Compensation carrier (R. at 14); 
(b) The worker's compensation carrier never denied 
liability and the actions on the part of Crawford Risk 
Management1 and its attorneys in investigating the third 
party claim and determining whether or not to accept liabil-
ity were conducted in a sufficiently expeditious manner as 
to not justify the imposition of a contingent fee in this 
case (R. at 15); 
(c) An attorney's fee of $1,000 was found to be 
reasonable and was properly approved (Id. ); and 
(d) The amount withheld [by Appellants] in excess of 
$1,000 should be paid over to Crawford Risk Management. 
(R. at 14-15. ) 
4. On November 12, 1987, Appellants moved for Review of 
Judge Sumsion's Order. (R. at 17-19.) Respondents also moved 
for review, asserting that an attorney's fee in the amount of 
$1,000 was excessive in this case. (R. at 23-24.) 
xCrawford Risk Management Co. was the adjuster for 
Defendant/Respondent National Union Fire Insurance Company. 
Because Crawford could not verify an acceptance of liability on 
Warren's industrial claim, the matter was referred to counsel for 
National Union Fire Insurance Company, who determined that 
liability would be accepted. National Union notified appellants 
of its determination within one month of Warren's industrial 
accident and approximately three weeks after Goicoechea became 
involved. (R. at 56-57.) 
5. The matter was set for a hearing with an unprecedented 
full Industrial Commission in attendance on September 22, 1988. 
(R. at 58.) 
6. On May 12, 1989, the Commission entered its Order 
Denying Motions For Review, affirming the Administrative Law 
Judge's factual determinations that: (1) $1,000 is a reasonable 
attorney's fee; and (2) Goicoechea "should turn over all but 
$1,000 of the Third Party Settlement to Crawford & Company 
(National Union Fire Insurance Co.). (R. at 59.) 
7. On June 8, 1989, Appellants filed their Petition for 
Review of the Commission's Final Order, thus obtaining review by 
this court. (R. at 63-65.) 
C. Statement of Facts: 
The Statement of Facts contained in Appellants' brief fails 
to either reference or accurately characterize the proceedings 
below. Therefore, respondents offer the following facts to 
properly present and clarify the Record. 
1. On June 2, 1987, Warren was jogging during her lunch 
hour when she was struck from behind by a car. (R. at 1-3, and 
56.) 
2. Due to Warren's state of incapacitation following the 
accident, her husband proceeded to seek legal assistance on her 
behalf and contacted Ronald E. Dalby ("Dalby") of Goicoechea Law 
Offices on either June 6, 1987, or June 7, 1987. (R. at 56.) 
3. On or about June 8, 1987, Warren's husband allegedly 
entered a contractual agreement with Goicoechea, in which 
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Goicoechea agreed to provide legal representation for Warren in 
her pursuit of insurance benefits from the auto liability carrier 
for the driver that struck Warren, id. 
4. The legal representation agreement allegedly specified 
that Goicoechea would be entitled to 33 1/3% of any recovery on 
the third party claim. (R. at 56-57.) 
5. During June, 1987, Dalby contacted both Farmer's 
Insurance, the third party auto liability insurance carrier, and 
Crawford & Company, the adjuster for National Union Fire 
Insurance Company, the worker's compensation insurance carrier 
for Warren's employer, Unisys. (R. at 56-57.) 
6. Although Crawford & Company could not verify an accep-
tance of liability for worker's compensation benefits when Dalby 
first called, due to some question regarding whether or not 
Warren was injured in the course of her employment, the attorney 
for National Union did determine that liability would be accepted 
for the worker's compensation benefits, and promptly notified 
Goicoechea of this determination on July 2, 1987. (R. at 57.) 
7. Within two weeks of Dalby's initial contact with 
Farmer's Insurance Company, Farmer's agreed to turn over the 
policy limits to Goicoechea on behalf of Warren, in the amount of 
$25,000. (R. at 57.) 
8. Goicoechea then directed that the third party settle-
ment ($25,000.00), less a 33 1/3% attorney's fee ($8,333.33), 
should be sent to Crawford & Company. Id. 
9. Mr. Dalby acknowledged that he and his office expended 
only five hours in obtaining the third party recovery on behalf 
of Warren. (Hearing Tr. at pp. 34-35.) 
10. There was no discussion nor negotiation between 
Goicoechea and Crawford & Company regarding how the proceeds of 
the third party settlement were to be distributed. (R. at 57.) 
11. Based upon Goicoechea1s failure to negotiate a reason-
able distribution of the third party settlement with respondents, 
Crawford noted that they could withhold payment of worker's 
compensation benefits until a suitable distribution had been 
agreed upon. However, no benefits have been withheld pending 
resolution of the issue of what attorney's fees should be charged 
to respondents by Goicoechea. (R. at 38-39 and 57.) 
12. Goicoechea filed a Petition for Approval of the contin-
gent Attorney's Fees with the Industrial Commission on September 
14, 1987. (R. at 57.) 
13. After Judge Sumsion approved an attorney's fee of 
$1,000.00 (R. at 13-16), the entire Industrial Commission, 
consisting of Commissioner Steve Hadley, Chairman and 
Commissioners John Florez and Thomas Carlson heard appellants' 
arguments on their Motion For Review on September 22, 1988. 
(Transcript of Industrial Commission Hearing at p. 4.) 
14. After fully considering the arguments of counsel and 
reviewing the applicable case authorities, the Commission made 
the following factual determination: 
The Commission agrees with the Administrative Law 
Judge that $1,000.00 is a "reasonable' attorney fee for 
-6-
the assistance Dalby provided to the applicant. Per 
the Administrative Law Judge's findings, anything more 
would be unreasonable considering the time and effort 
Dalby asserted. Therefore, Dalby should turn over all 
but $1,000.00 of the Third-Party settlement to Crawford 
& Company/National Union Fire Insurance. 
(R. at 58.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Because substantial evidence supports the conclusion of the 
Administrative Law Judge and the Industrial Commission that it 
was not reasonable to impose a contingent fee contract upon the 
worker's compensation carrier in the instant case and that, under 
the circumstances presented, $1,000 is a reasonable attorney's 
fee, this Court may properly give maximum deference to the 
Commission's final Order. This is especially true where, as 
here, Appellants fail to provide any factual support for their 
contentions on appeal and otherwise rely upon inapplicable 
contentions raised for the first time on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S FINDINGS SHOULD 
NOT BE DISPLACED. 
A
- Substantial Evidence Supports the Decisions of the 
Administrative Law Judge and the Industrial Commission Which 
Should Be Affirmed Pursuant to the Appropriate Standard of 
Review. 
The Utah Supreme Court explained the appropriate standard of 
review for Industrial Commission cases in Blaine v. Industrial 
Commission. 700 P.2d 1084, 1086 (Utah 1985), concluding that 
,fthe Commission's findings are not to be displaced in the absence 
of a showing that they are arbitrary and capricious." The Court 
clarified this standard of review in Rushton v. Gelco Express, 
732 P.2d at 109 (Utah 1986), explaining that the findings and 
orders of the Commission are not arbitrary and capricious unless 
"they are contrary to the evidence or without any reasonable 
basis in the evidence." 
In Blaine, the Utah Supreme Court referred to the prior 
case of Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888 (Utah 
1982), in order to outline the Appellate Court's function in 
reviewing Industrial Commission findings: 
[I]t is apparent that this Court's function in 
reviewing Commission findings of fact is a strictly 
limited one in which the question is not whether the 
Court agrees with the Commission's findings or whether 
they are supported by a preponderance of evidence. 
Instead, the reviewing Court's inquiry is whether the 
Commission's findings are "arbitrary or capricious," or 
"wholly without cause," or contrary to the "one 
(inevitable) conclusion from the evidence," or without 
"any substantial evidence" to support them. Only then 
should the Commission's findings be displaced. 
(Citations omitted.) 
Kaiser Steel, 732 P.2d at 890. See also Lancaster v. Gilbert 
Development, 736 P.2d 237, 238 (Utah 1987). 
Accordingly, this Court "give[s] maximum deference to the 
basic facts determined by the agency, which will be sustained if 
there is evidence of any substance that can be reasonably 
regarded as supporting the determination made." Wilson v. 
Industrial Commission, 735 P.2d 403, 403 (Utah App. 198 7) 
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(citing Allen & Assoc, v. Industrial Commission, 732 P.2d SOS-
SOS (Utah 1987)). 
In the instant case, substantial evidence supports the 
factual conclusion of the Administrative Law Judge and Commission 
that no more than $1,000 is a reasonable attorney fee for the 
services rendered on behalf of Warren by Goicoechea Law Offices. 
Indeed, Mr. Dalby admitted that he had worked only five hours in 
obtaining the third party settlement on the claim in which lia-
bility was admitted. (Hearing Tr. at pp. 34-35.) 
In addition, the Administrative Law Judge and the Industrial 
Commission clearly concluded that the actions of Unisys and 
National Union and its attorneys in investigating this claim and 
determining whether or not to accept liability "were conducted in 
a sufficiently expeditious manner as to not justify the imposi-
tion of a contingent fee in this case." (R. at 15 and 58.) 
Thus, it was not "reasonable" for Goicoechea Law Offices to 
expect to recover one-third of the total amount obtained in the 
third party settlement. Accordingly, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
S 35-1-62, Respondents should not be obligated to pay a propor-
tionate share of an attorney's fee which is not "reasonable." 
(R. at 58.) 
The decision of Lanier v. Pvne, 29 Utah 2d 249, 508 P.2d 38 
(1973) squarely addresses the issue raised in the instant case. 
In Lanier, the court declared that the worker's compensation 
insurance carrier, which recovers a portion of the third party 
settlement obtained by the applicant's counsel, must participate 
in a proportionate share of the applicant's attorney's fees. 
However, the court states a significant qualification applicable 
to the section 35-1-62 obligation. As referenced by the 
Industrial Commission/ the Utah Supreme Court clearly declared 
that: 
It should be here restated, as was indicated in the Worthen 
case, supra, that [the Worker's Compensation Carrier's] 
obligation was only to pay its proportionate share of a 
"reasonable" attorney's fee as determined by the court and 
not necessarily an amount contracted for by the plaintiff. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Lanier, 508 P.2d at p. 40. 
In applying the holding of Lanier in the instant case, the 
Industrial Commission concluded that respondents need not pay a 
share of the unreasonable attorney's fee allegedly contracted by 
Warren's husband. The Commission stated: 
$1,000 is a "reasonable" attorney fee for the assistance 
Dalby provided to the applicant. Per the Administrative Law 
Judge's findings, anything more would be unreasonable 
considering the time and effort Dalby asserted. Therefore, 
Dalby should turn over all but $1,000 of the third party 
settlement to Crawford & Company/National Union Fire 
Insurance. (R. at 58.) 
Based on this factual determination, the Industrial 
Commission denied the Motions for Review and affirmed the 
Administrative Law Judge's Order of October 29, 1987. The Orders 
of the Administrative Law Judge and the Industrial Commission are 
clearly based upon the facts acknowledged by Mr. Dalby and 
Goicoechea Law Offices in the hearing before Judge Sumsion and in 
the hearing before the entire Industrial Commission. The facts 
unquestionably support the conclusion of the Administrative Law 
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Judge to the effect that a finding of attorney's fees must not be 
based upon a contingent fee because liability was never con-
tested. The facts also support the commission finding that no 
more than $1,000 is an appropriate attorney's fee to be charged 
to the worker's compensation carrier in the instant case because 
Goicoechea only spent five hours in obtaining the Settlement of 
uncontested claims. 
The conclusion of the Commission is also amply supported by 
the following factual determinations: 
(1) Farmers Insurance, the insurer for the third party 
tort feasor never denied liability for the accident. In fact, 
Farmers admitted liability when first contacted by both Crawford 
& Company and Goicoechea. (R. at 56-58.) 
(2) Crawford & Company never denied liability for 
worker's compensation benefits; it simply indicated a need to 
investigate and evaluate the claim, because of its complexity, 
prior to making a determination of liability. Id. 
(3) Warren's counsel, Goicoechea, rushed into negotia-
tion of a contingent fee contract with the applicant's husband 
prior to ascertaining whether or not any claim asserted by the 
applicant would be denied, so as to be subject to a contest 
requiring the services of an attorney. Id. See also (Transcript 
of Industrial Commission Hearing at pp. 12-13.) Indeed, Warren 
never participated in the hiring of Goicoechea since she was 
unconscious and in the hospital during the relevant period of 
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time. There is no evidence of record that Goicoechea ever did 
enter into a contingent fee contract with Warren herself. Id. 
(4) Goicoechea never did enter into a contingent fee 
contract with the defendants/respondents relative to the defen-
dants1 possible subrogation interest in connection with a third 
party claim. (R. at 56-58.) 
(5) The $5,000 in no-fault benefits were not "obtained 
by Goicoechea"; liability therefore was never questioned and was 
always payable. (R. at 56-58.) 
(6) The record supports the determination of the 
Administrative Law Judge and the Commission with respect to 
reasonableness of attorneys fees in light of the fact that most 
of the time spent by Goicoechea was in hastily making preliminary 
inquiry of both Crawford & Company and Farmers concerning their 
position on liability. Pursuant to those inquiries, Goicoechea 
was never informed of any denial of liability and was in fact 
informed, within a reasonable time, that liability was being 
accepted by both Farmers for third party benefits and by Crawford 
& Company for worker's compensation benefits. Id. See also (R. 
at 13-16) . 
The facts as determined by the Administrative Law Judge and 
the Commission more than adequately support the conclusion that 
not more than five hours total time was spent by Goicoechea in 
connection with this matter. Such an estimate of time spent is 
more than generous. As asserted by Respondents in a separately 
filed Motion for Review, the expenditure of a minimal time on the 
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part of Goicoechea does not even justify a determination of an 
attorneys fee in the sum of $1,000. This is especially true in 
light of the fact that when Goicoechea first contacted Crawford & 
Company concerning this matter, it represented that it was 
calling on behalf of Warren as "a favor" to her. (R. at 26.) 
Therefore, Respondents urge this court to give ''maximum 
deference to the basic facts determined by the agency, which will 
be sustained if there is evidence of any substance that can be 
reasonably regarded as supporting the determination made." 
Wilson v. Industrial Commission, 735 P.2d 403, 403 (Utah App. 
1987) (citing Allen & Associates v. Industrial Commission, 732 
P.2d 508, 509 (Utah 1987)). In the instant case, the Commission 
and the Administrative Law Judge have both determined, as a 
factual matter, that $1,000 is a reasonable attorney fee and that 
any amount in excess of $1,000 obtained by Goicoechea should be 
delivered to Respondents. (R. at 56-59.) Based on the substan-
tial evidence supporting these factual determinations, the 
Commission's findings should not be displaced. 
POINT II 
APPELLANTS IMPROPERLY RAISED CONTENTIONS 
SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED FOR THE FIRST TIME 
ON APPEAL AND ARE OTHERWISE UNSUPPORTED AND 
INAPPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE. 
The Utah Supreme Court has forcefully and consistently held 
that it will not consider issues raised for the first time on 
appeal. Sorensen v. Larsen, 740 P.2d 1336 (Utah 1987); Topik v. 
Thurber, 739 P.2d 1101, 1103 (Utah 1987); and Inslev 
Manufacturing Corp. v. Draper Bank & Trust, 717 P.2d 1341, 1347 
(Utah 1986). The record must clearly show that an issue was 
"timely presented to the trial court in a manner sufficient to 
obtain a ruling thereon. We cannot assume that it was properly 
raised." Franklin Financial v. Empire Development Co., 659 P.2d 
1040, 1044 (Utah 1983). If a party fails to present an issue to 
the trial court, they will have waived the right to raise it on 
appeal. 
In the instant case, Appellants assert numerous legal 
arguments and facts which are beyond the scope of the record. 
For example, Goicoechea's arguments regarding waiver of rights 
and interference with independent contracts were not raised 
before the Commission and are inappropriately raised for the 
first time on appeal. Similarly, appellants argue that the 
Commission erroneously interpreted the law and attempted to 
abrogate contingent fees. Despite an opportunity at the hearing 
before the full Commission, Goicoechea failed to raise such 
contentions. In support of the newly raised contention, appel-
lants cite Prettvman v. Utah State Department of Finance, 27 Utah 
2d 333, 496 P.2d 89 (1972). However, Prettvman does not support 
the argument asserted. 
In Prettvman the Court noted that pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
S 35-1-62, a Worker's Compensation carrier should only "bear its 
pro rata share of whatever attorney's fee was reasonable in 
obtaining the settlement." Prettvman, 496 P.2d at 91. Thus, 
reasonableness is the determining factor. The Prettvman decision 
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is distinguished from the instant case because (1) liability was 
contested; (2) a cause of action was actually filed against the 
third party; and (3) it took fourteen months to obtain a settle-
ment. In contrast, in the instant case, liability was admitted 
and Goicoechea only expended five hours to obtain the settlement. 
In the words of the Commission, anything more than $1,000.00 
attorney's fees would be "unreasonable" in this case. (R. at 
58.) 
Likewise, Goicoecheafs suggested application of the decision 
in Taylor v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 743 P.2d 1183, 1185 
(Utah 1987) is inappropriate for several reasons. First, Taylor 
does not address the critical issue of determining a reasonable 
attorney's fee. Second, the Taylor decision does not in any way 
nullify or depart from the Court's prior Lanier decision, requir-
ing payment of a proportionate amount of a "reasonable attorney's 
fee as determined by the court and not necessarily an amount 
contracted for by the plaintiff." Lanier, 508 P.2d at 90. 
Third, in the instant case, the sole issue for discussion is 
whether or not a contingent fee is reasonable under the circum-
stances of this case. Finally, the contention of appellant's 
regarding recovery of a contingent attorney's fee in this case 
would be more likely to result in uncertainties and inequities, 
especially if Goicoechea recovers one third of $25,000 for only 
five hours of work. The Commission has already determined that 
such a recovery is "unreasonable." (R. at 58.) 
Appellants also mistakenly argue that the Industrial 
Commission exceeded its authority in denying their Motion for 
Review, or in the alternative that the Commission decision was 
premature based on na failure to conduct a hearing." Neverthe-
less, Mr. Dalby acknowledged before the entire Industrial 
Commission that the Commission had full authority to render a 
decision in response to his Motion for Review. (Hearing Tr. at 
pp. 27, 29 and 30.) Importantly, it was in a "Hearing" that 
Mr. Dalby made this acknowledgement. Thus, the suggestion that 
Review was premature is not only contradictory, but it is also so 
transparently contrived as to warrant sanctions. In addition, 
any Objection to the Administrative Law Judge's Order should be 
considered abandoned because Appellant failed to raise any 
objection to Judge Sumsion's Order. Thus, not only did the 
unmodified Order approving $1,000.00 in attorney's fees have the 
effect of denying Appellants1 unraised objections by necessary 
implication, but the action of Appellants in acknowledging 
appropriate commission review also indicates an intention to 
abandon any suggested objections. Appellants assertions of 




THIS COURT SHOULD ASSUME THE CORRECTNESS OF 
THE JUDGMENT BELOW. 
A. Appellants Failed To Refer To The Record To Factually 
Support Their Contentions On Appeal. 
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that it will 
assume the correctness of the judgment below where, as here, an 
appellant does not support facts set forth in his or her Brief 
with citations to the Record. Trees v. Lewis, 738 P.2d 612, 613 
(Utah 1987) and State v. Tucker, 657 P.2d 755, 756-57 (Utah 
1982). In Trees, this court declared that it: 
will assume the correctness of the judgment below where 
counsel on appeal does not comply with the requirements of 
Rule 75(p)(2)(2)(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as to 
making a concise statement of facts and citation of the 
pages in the record where they are supported. (Citations 
omitted.)2 
In Trees, the fact statement in the appellant's Brief 
referred to documents by their exhibit numbers, but contained no 
citations to the Records. Occasional references to the record 
appeared in the Argument section of the Brief. Trees, 738 P.2d 
at 612, n.2. 
Similarly, in State v. Tucker, 657 P.2d 755, 756-57 (Utah 
1982), the court concluded that: 
A separate and independent basis for the affirmance of the 
trial court is that the defendant failed to refer to any 
portion of the record that factually supports his contention 
on appeal. 
2
 Rule 24(a)(6), Rules of the Court of Appeals, which became 
effective in April 1987, ultimately replaced former Utah Rule of 
Civil Procedure 75(p)(2)(2)(d), but did not alter the requirement 
that citations to the record support the fact statement in the 
briefs. See Trees, 738 P.2d at 613, n.3. 
-1 7-
In the instant case, despite references to their own 
Addendum, Appellants failed to refer to the Record to support any 
factual contentions. (Appellants' Brief at pp.4-6). According-
ly, this Court should assume the correctness of the judgment 
below based on Appellants' failure to refer to any factual 
support in the Record, and may affirm the judgment on this 
independent basis. 
Under these circumstances, Respondents respectfully urge 
this Court to uphold the factual determinations of the Commission 
which should be sustained because there is substantial evidence 
supporting the determinations made. 
CONCLUSION 
The Record demonstrates that the overwhelming weight of 
evidence supports the Order of the Administrative Law Judge and 
the Final Order of the Commission on the essential issues in this 
case. It is unnecessary and contrary to the applicable standard 
of review for this court to attempt to second-guess the judgment 
of the Administrative Law Judge and the full Commission on the 
factual issues which only involve the weight of the evidence 
herein. This is especially true where the weight of the evidence 
clearly favors the determination made in favor of Respondents. 
Based on the foregoing, Respondents respectfully request that 
this Court affirm the determination of the Industrial Commission, 
denying Appellant's Petition for Review. 
-18-
DATED this 4th day of December, 1989. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
^ar^yR. Laycock 
Attorneys for Defendants Unisys 
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Jerry K. LANIER, Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Harold D. PYNE and Gibbons & Reed Com-
piny, a corporation, Defendants 
and Respondents, 
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, 
Intervenor and Appellant. 
No. 12918. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
March 23, 1073. 
An appeal was taken hy subrogated 
workmen's compensation carrier from a 
judgment of the Third District Court, Salt 
Lake County, Joseph G. Jeppson, J., re-
quiring compensation carrier to bear pro-
portionate share of injured workman's at-
torneys' fees incurred in negligence ac-
tion. The Supreme Court, Crockett. J., 
held that the fact that compensation car-
rier, which intervened in negligence ac-
tion to protect its right of subrogation, noti-
fied injured workman and his attorneys that 
carrier did not desire their representation 
and had hired its own counsel did not enti-
tle carrier to escape liability for its pro-
portionate share of cost and attorneys' fees, 
since workman should have basic control of 
his action. 
Affirmed. 
Henriod, J., filed a dissenting opinion 
in which Callister, C. J., concurred. 
I. Workmen's Compensation €=>225l 
Purpose of amendment to provide for 
full reimbursement of compensation car-
rier out of sum recovered in tort action by 
injured workman less proportionate share 
of costs and attorneys' fees is to have in-
surance carrier, whose rights should be re-
garded as secondary to plaintiffs interests, 
bear its proportion of these expenses in-
stead of having them come entirely out of 
injured workman's share of settlement. 
U.C.A.1953, 35-1-62, 35-1-62(2). 
2. Workmen's Compensation $=2251 
Fact that carrier which by reason of 
its right of subrogation intervened in in-
jured workman's tort action notified in-
jured workman and his attorneys that it 
did not desire their representation and that 
its own attorneys who would protect car-
rier's interest did not relieve carrier of 
duty to bear proportionate share of ex-
penses and attorneys' fees incurred by in-
jured workman following settlement of suit, 
since workman should have basic control 
of his action. U.C.AJ953, 35-1-62,. 35-1-
62(2). 
3. Workmen's Compensation $=2251 
Insurance carrier which has paid com-
pensation has preference for reimbursement 
for amount it has paid as compensation 
from any recovery by injured workman in 
negligence action and the injured workman 
can have only the excess he is able to ob-
tain. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-62, 35-1-62(2). 
4. Workmen's Compensation C=>\\ 
Purpose of Workmen's Compensation 
Act is to benefit injured employees and 
not to impair or destroy natural rights 
which exist by reason of the common law 
to sue for redress of wrongful acts. U.CA. 
1953, 35-3-1 et seq., 35-1-62; Const, art. 
8, § 19. 
5. Workmen's Compensation <S=>225I 
District courts, upon proper application 
and due consideration of facts shown in 
light of its plenary powers in administer-
ing law and equity, can make such orders 
as are necessary and expedient in order 
to do justice between parties as the particu-
lar circumstances warrant with regard to 
liability of workmen's compensation car-
rier to share proportionate costs and attor-
neys' fees incurred in tort action by in-
jured workman. U.C.A.1953, 33-1-62, 35-
1-62(2). 
Richard H. Moffat, Moffat, Welling, 
Taylor & Paulsen, Salt Lake City, for in-
tervenor and appellant. 
Gayle Dean Hunt, Dwight L. King, Salt 
Lake City, for plaintiff and respondent. 
CROCKETT, Justice: 
Plaintiff, Jerry K. Lanier, while driving 
a yellow cab was injured in a collision with 
a truck belonging to Gibbons & Reed Con-
struction Company. For his injury and 
disability he was paid workmen's compen-
A - l 
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sation totaling $3,301.22 by Liberty Mutual 
Insurance Company. Meanwhile, the plain-
tiff had employed his own attorneys on a 
one-third contingent fee basis to sue Gib-
bons & Rccd for about $100,000 for negli-
gently causing him injuries and damage, 
as perm itted by Section 35-1-62, U.CA. 
1953. 
During the pendency of the action, Lib-
erty Mutual, through its attorneys, inter-
vened, asserting its right to subrogation to 
plaintiff's claim against Gibbons & Reed. 
Prior to trial the suit was settled for the 
sum of S14,000. 
[1] It is not questioned that Liberty 
Mutual was entitled to reimbursement for 
the $3,30122 it had paid to the plaintiff. 
The controversy is over whether it must 
bear its proportionate share of the fees 
paid to the plaintiff's attorneys. Hereto-
fore there was concededly some uncertain-
ty in our statute. Sec. 35-1-62, as it former-
ly read: 
If any recovery is obtained 
against such third person it shall be dis-
bursed as follows: 
(1) The reasonable expense of the 
action, including attorneys' fees, shall 
be paid and charged proportionately 
against the parties as their interests 
may appear. 
{2) The person liable for compensa-
tion payments shall be reimbursed in 
full for all payments made. 
In the case of VVorthen v. Shurtleff and 
Andrews, Inc.,1 and other cases we have 
held that the plaintiff and the subrogated 
insurance carrier should each bear its pro-
portionate share of the costs and the attor-
ney's fees incurred in obtaining the recov-
ery. The legislature has since amended 
paragraph (2) of Sec. 35-1-62, U.C.A.1953, 
so that it now provides: 
(2) The person liable for compensation 
payments shall be reimbursed in full 
for all payments made less the propor-
I. 39 Utah 2d 80, 420 P.2d 223 (19G7) ; 
Graham r. Industrial Commission. 26 
Utah 2d 424, 491 P.2d 223 (1971); 
Pmtyman v. Utah State Department of 
v. PYNE Utah 39 
S P.2d 38 
tionate share of costs and attorneys' 
fees provided for in subsection (J).2 
[Emphasis added.] 
The addition of the emphasized language 
to the statute seems plainly intended to 
eliminate the previously existing uncertain-
ty and to make it clear that "the person 
liable for compensation payments [Liberty 
Mutual] shall be reimbursed in full for 
all payments made less the proportionate 
share of costs and attorneys' fees", so that 
the insurance carrier will bear its propor-
tion of these expenses, instead of having 
them come entirely out of the plaintiff's 
share of the settlement. 
[2] However, by indulging in a process 
of rationalization, and by following a pro-
cedure presently to be stated, Liberty Mu-
tual contends that notwithstanding the 
amendment, it is still not obliged to bear 
any portion of plaintiff's attorney's fees. 
This contention is based on the following 
propositions: that by reason of its right 
of subrogation, it properly intervened in 
the action; that inasmuch as it would be 
required to pay attorney's fees, it should 
be privileged to choose its own attorneys; 
that it notified the plaintiff and his attor-
neys that it did not desire their representa-
tion; and that its own attorneys would 
protect its interests. Liberty Mutual does 
not disagree with the cases above referred 
to, but asserts that this one is different be-
cause in none of them does it appear that 
the plaintiff was put on notice, as he was 
here, that the insurance carrier had hired 
its own counsel and would protect its own 
interest. It thus raises what it asserts to 
be the sole issue in this case: that when 
it has thus hired its own counsel and given 
such notice, it is not required to participate 
in proportional payment of the costs and 
attorney's fees incurred by the plaintiff. 
The answer to this argument of Liberty 
Mutual is that its effect would be to allow 
the insurer, by the simple expedient of de-
Finasce, 27 Utah 2d 333. 496 P-2d 80 
(1972). 
2. Laws of Utah 1971, Cb. 76, Sec 3. 
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daring in advance that it would not abide 
by the statute, to defeat the plainly stated 
legislative intent that the insurer's reim-
bursement should be " . . . less the pro-
portionate share of costs and attorneys' 
fees . " incurred in the action. 
This certainly was intended to apply to the 
attorney's fees incurred by the plaintiff. 
The trial court correctly so ruled and re-
quired Liberty Mutual to participate in its 
proportional share of the costs and attor-
ney's fees the plaintiff had incurred in ob-
taining the settlement, which assured the 
reimbursement for Liberty Mutual. It 
should be here restated, as was indicated 
in the Worthen case, supra, that Liberty 
Mutual's obligation was only to pay its pro-
portionate share of a "reasonable" attor-
ney's fee as determined by the court, and 
not necessarily an amount contracted for 
by the plaintiff. 
We are not insensitive to the possibility 
of problems which could arise as suggested 
by the arguments of Liberty Mutual: e. g., 
where the injured workman does not 
promptly bring his action; or where the 
carrier has made extensive investigation, 
which is made available to the plaintiff; 
and/or where its subrogation is obviously 
to the larger proportion of the claim against 
a third party; and/or where there is a basis 
for genuine concern as tc the inadequacy 
of counsel chosen by the plaintiff. With 
respect thereto we make the following ob-
servations: The first and controlling one 
in this case is that the trial court did not 
find them to exist here. It is plainly ap-
parent from the possibility of having to 
bear part of plaintiff's attorney's icts. The 
trial court found that the action was in-
itiated and the settlement obtained solely 
through the efforts of the plaintiff and his 
attorneys. This reinforces the justifica-
tion for the trial court's conclusion that 
the requirement of the statute quoted above 
(Sec. 35-1-62, Subsection (2), as amend-
ed), must be met by reimbursement of Lib-
erty Mutual for the payments it had made 
'less the proportionate share of costs and 
attorneys* fees" incurred by plaintiff in 
obtaining the settlement. We could there 
write "sufficient unto the day is the evil 
thereof", consider the matter finished, and 
let other problems abide until presented in 
genuine controversy. 
[3] However, counsel have assured us 
of their concern with possible difficulties 
in other such cases. With respect thereto, 
and also as bearing upon the decision we 
have arrived at in this case, we offer 
these further comments: Considerations of 
reason and policy impel the conclusion that 
the plaintiff, the one who has suffered 
the injury' and damage, should have basic 
ownership and control of his cause of ac-
tion. It is most natural to suppose that 
he will try to obtain the maximum possible 
recovery. But the insurance carrier has 
first preference for reimbursement for the 
amount it has paid as compensation, and 
the plaintiff can have only any excess that 
he is able to obtain. This is true notwith-
standing the fact that said Section 62 states 
that when the carrier pays compensation it 
shall become "[the] trustee of the cause of 
action." It is the trustee for the plaintiff, 
the true beneficiary and owner thereof. 
The interest of the carrier extends only to 
the amount of compensation it has paid; 
and its only real interest is to obtain its 
full reimbursement. Except for any al-
truistic motive it may or may not have for 
the plaintiff, it has no incentive to obtain 
further recovery for him. 
[4] It is because of the policy consid-
erations just stated, and the sequence of 
the grant in the statute, that we think it 
reasonable to conclude that the rights con-
ferred upon the insurance carrier should 
be regarded as secondary to the plaintiff's 
interest, and so conferred as a safeguard 
to the carrier and to thus afford it a means 
of protecting its interest in case the injured 
employee does not do so. But this preroga-
tive granted the insurance carrier should 
not be deemed to diminish or adversely af-
fect the right of the injured employee to 
A - 3 
STATE v. 
Cite a* ri(h 
proceed against the third party.3 This is 
in accord with the purpose of the Work-
men's Compensation Act, which is to bene-
fit injured employees and not to impair or 
destroy natural rights which exist by rea-
son of the common law to sue for the re-
dress of wrongful acts.4 
[5] With respect to all of these matters 
it is further pertinent to note that the 
district court, which has jurisdiction of 
<uch actions, upon proper application, and 
due consideration of the facts shown, in 
li^ht of its plenary powers in administering 
law and equity,5 can make such orders as 
are necessary and expedient in order to do 
justice between the parties as the particular 
circumstances warrant.6 
Affirmed. Costs to plaintiff as against 
intervenor Libenv Mutual Insurance Com-
pany. 
ELLETT and TUCKETT, J]., concur. 
HEXRIOD, Justice (dissenting): 
Respectfully I dissent. This case and the 
Worthen case, and the others cited in the 
main opinion, in my opinion, flout the pur-
pose of workmen's compensation. They 
allow an attorney's fee to get an award 
from the Industrial Commission—at tax-
payers' expense, and I think another at-
torney's fee of 33i/ifJ to sue a third party, 
and then another 3 3 ^ or 509c for whatever 
5S collected from the insurance company 
by virtue of a statute that flies in the teeth 
of the purpose and intent of the Workmen's 
Compensation statute: that of paying com-
pensation, from statutory funds, intended 
for compensation of the worker's family 
budget. 
The majority opinion blushingly should 
admit to the rendering of obeisance and 
comfort to someone other than the person 
for whom the statute should be, and for 
whom it was passed. 
CALLISTER, C. J., concurs in the dis-
senting opinion of HEXRIOD, J. 
3. See Rosnlaki v. Phillips Petroleum Co.. 
3 Utah 2d 203, 2S2 P.2d 304 (1955). 
4- Larson, Workmen's Compensation Low. 
Vol. 2, Set*. 71:10-75:40. 
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Retpondent, 
v. 
Eugene MYERS, Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 12738. 
Supremo Court of Utah. 
March 27, 1073. 
The Third District Court of Salt Lake 
County, Gordon R. Hall, J., found defend-
ant guilty of forgery, a noncapital felony 
offense, and he appealed. The Supreme 
Court, Ellctt. J., held that defendant waived 
his right to be present in court where, aft-
er the trial had begun, the defendant asked 
for and was granted a continuance in order 
for an out-of-state witness to appear and 
testify, but where, on the morning the trial 
was to resume, neither the witness nor the 
defendant, who had been at liberty on bail 
and who intentionally absconded as soon 
as he was granted the continuance, could 
be found. 
Judgment affirmed. 
Crockett, J., concurred specially with 
opinion. 
1. Criminal Law €=>636(l) 
A trial involving a charge of felony 
cannot be commenced in the absence of 
defendant in view of statute providing "If 
the prosecution is for a felony, the defend-
ant must be personally present at the trial." 
U.C.A.1953, 77-27-3. 
2. Criminal Law €=636(1) 
Every defendant has the right to be 
present in court at all stages of the trial, 
but it is not absolutely necessary for a de-
fendant who was at large upon bail or 
recognizance charged with a noncapital of-
fense to be personally present in court 
during all of the proceedings at his trial; 
it is a right which may be waived under 
certain circumstances. U.CA.1953, 77-
27-3. 
5. Utah Const.. Art. VIII. Set-. 19. 
6. See diicuwion in Man son v. Nelson. 289 
Minn. 99, 182 N.W\2d TOO (1970). 
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A certificate from the duly authorized officer of the 
industrial commission or similar department of an-
other state certifying that the employer of such other 
state is insured therein and has provided extraterri-
torial coverage insuring his employees while working 
within this state shall be prima facie evidence that 
such employer carries such compensation insurance. 
1SS3 
35-1*56. Compliance with act — Notice to em-
ployees. 
Each employer providing insurance, or electing di-
rectly to pay compensation to his injured, or the de-
pendents of his killed employees, as herein provided, 
shall post in conspicuous places about his place of 
business typewritten or printed notices stating, that 
he has complied with the provisions of this title and 
all the rules and regulations of the commission made 
in pursuance thereof, and if such is the case, that he 
has been authorized by the commission directly to 
compensate such employees or dependents; and the 
same, when so posted, shall constitute sufficient no-
tice to his employees of the fact that he has complied 
with the law as to securing compensation to his em-
ployees and their dependents. wn 
35-1-57. Noncompliance — Penalty. 
Employers who shall fail to comply with the provi-
sions of Section 35-1-46 shall not be entitled to the 
benefits of this title during the period of noncompli-
ance, but shall be liable in a civil action to their em-
ployees for damages suffered by reason of personal 
injuries arising out of or in the course of employment 
caused by the wrongful act, neglect or default of the 
employer or any of the employer's officers, agents or 
employees, and also to the dependents or personal 
representatives of such employees where death re-
sults from such injuries. In any such action the defen-
dant shall not avail himself of any of the following 
defenses: the defense of the fellow-servant rule, the 
defense of assumption of risk, or the defense of con-
tributory negligence. Proof of the injury shall consti-
tute prima facie evidence of negligence on the part of 
the employer and the burden shall be upon the em-
ployer to show freedom from negligence resulting in 
such injury. And such employers shall also be subject 
to the provisions of the two sections next succeeding 
[Sections 35-1-58,35-1-59]. In any civil action permit-
ted under this section against the employer the em-
ployee shall be entitled to necessary costs and a rea-
sonable attorney fees assessed against the employer. 
IMS 
35-1*58. Rights of employees where employer 
fails to comply. 
Any employee, whose employer has failed to com-
ply with the provisions of Section 35-1-46, who has 
been injured by accident arising out of or in the 
course of his employment, wheresoever such injury 
occurred, if the same was not purposely self-inflicted, 
or his dependents in case death has ensued, may, in 
lieu of proceeding against his employer by civil action 
in the courts as provided in the last preceding section 
(Section 35-1-57], file his application with the com-
mission for compensation in accordance with the 
terms of this title, and the commission shall hear and 
determine such application for compensation as in 
other cases; and the amount of compensation which 
the commission may ascertain and determine to be 
due to such injured employee, or his dependents in 
case death has ensued, shall be paid by such employer 
to the persons entitled thereto within ten days after 
receiving notice of the amount thereof as so fixed and 
determined by the commission. law 
35-1-59. Docketing awards in district court —-
Enforcing judgment 
An abstract of any award may be Hied in the office 
of the clerk of the district court of any county in the 
state, and must be docketed in the judgment docket of 
the district court thereof. The time of the receipt of 
the abstract must be noted by him thereon and en-
tered in the docket. When so filed and docketed the 
award shall constitute a lien from the time of such 
docketing upon the real property of the employer sit-
uated in the county, for a period of eight years from 
the date of the award unless previously satisfied. Ex-
ecution may be issued thereon within the same time 
and in the same manner and with the same effect as 
if said award were a judgment of the district court. 
In cases where the employer was uninsured at the 
time of the injury, the county attorney for the county 
in which the applicant or the employer resides, de-
pending on the district in which the final award is 
docketed, shall enforce the judgment when requested 
by the industrial commission. Where the action to 
enforce a judgment is initiated by other counsel, rea-
sonable attorney's fees and court costs shall be al-
lowed in addition to the award. ltrs 
35-1-60. Exclusive remedy against employer, or 
officer, agent or employee — Occupa-
tional disease excepted. 
The right to recover compensation pursuant to the 
provisions of this title for injuries sustained by an 
employee, whether resulting in death or not, shall be 
the exclusive remedy against the employer and shall 
be the exclusive remedy against any officer, agent or 
employee of the employer and the liabilities of the 
employer imposed by this act shall be in place of any 
and all other civil liability whatsoever, at common 
law or otherwise, to such employee or to his spouse, 
widow, children, parents, dependents, next of kin, 
heirs, personal representatives, guardian, or any 
other person whomsoever, on account of any accident 
or injury or death, in any way contracted, sustained, 
aggravated or incurred by such employee in the 
course of or because of or arising out of his employ-
ment, and no action at law may be maintained 
against an employer or against any officer, agent or 
employee of the employer based upon any accident, 
injury or death of an employee. Nothing in this sec-
tion, however, shall prevent an employee (or his de-
pendents) from filing a claim with the industrial com-
mission of Utah for compensation in those cases 
within the provisions of the Utah Occupational Dis-
ease Disability Act, as amended. tsss 
35-1-61. Repealed. mi 
35-1-62. Injuries or death caused by wrongful 
acts of persons other than employer, 
officer, agent, or employee of said em-
ployer — Rights of employer or insur-
ance carrier in cause of action — Main-
tenance of action — Notice of intention 
to proceed against third party — Right 
to maintain action not involving em-
ployee-employer relationship — Dis-
bursement of proceeds of recovery. 
When any injury or death for which compensatior 
is payable under this title shall have been caused b; 
the wrongful act or neglect of a person other than a' 
employer, officer, agent, or employee of said en 
ployer, the injured employee, or in case of death h 
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dependents, may claim compensation and the injured 
employee or his heirs or personal representative may 
also have an action for damages against such third 
person. U compensation is claimed and the employer 
or insurance carrier becomes obligated to pay com-
pensation, the employer or insurance carrier shall be-
come trustee of the cause of action against the third 
party and may bring and maintain the action either 
in its own name or in the name of the injured em-
ployee, or his heirs or the personal representative of 
the deceased, provided the employer or carrier may 
not settle and release the cause of action without the 
consent of the commission. Before proceeding against 
the third party, the injured employee, or, in case of 
death, his heirs, shall give written notice of such in-
tention to the carrier or other person obligated for the 
compensation payments, in order to give such person 
a reasonable opportunity to enter an appearance in 
the proceeding. 
For the purposes of this section and notwithstand-
ing the provisions of Section 35-1-42, the injured em-
ployee or his heirs or personal representative may 
also maintain an action for damages against subcon-
tractors, general contractors, independent contrac-
tors, property owners or their lessees or assigns, not 
occupying an employee-employer relationship with 
the injured or deceased employee at the time of his 
injury or death. 
If any recovery is obtained against such third per-
son it shall be disbursed as follows: 
(1) The reasonable expense of the action, in-
cluding attorneys' fees, shall be paid and charged 
proportionately against the parties as their inter-
ests may appear. Any such fee chargeable to the 
employer or carrier is to be a credit upon any fee 
payable by the injured employee or, in the case of 
death, by the dependents, for any recovery had 
against the third party. 
(2) The person liable for compensation pay-
ments shall be reimbursed in full for all pay-
ments made less the proportionate share of costs 
and attorneys' fees provided for in Subsection (1). 
(3) The balance shall be paid to the injured 
employee or his heirs in case of death, to be ap-
plied to reduce or satisfy in full any obligation 
thereafter accruing against the person liable for 
compensation. 1975 
35-1-63. Judgments in favor of commission — 
Preference. 
All judgments obtained in any action prosecuted by 
the commission or by the state under the authority of 
this title shall have the same preference against the 
assets of the employer as claims for taxes. l tu 
35-1-64. Compensation — None for first three 
days after injury unless disability ex-
tended. 
No compensation shall be allowed for the first three 
days after the injury is received, except the disburse-
ments hereinafter authorized for medical, nurse and 
hospital services, and for medicines and funeral ex-
penses, provided, however, if the period of total tem-
porary disability lasts more than fourteen days, com-
pensation shall also be payable for the first three 
days after the injury is received. ISTS 
35-1-65. Temporary disability — Amount of 
payments — State average weekly 
wage defined. 
(1) In case of temporary disability, the employee 
shall receive 66-v3rr of that employee's average 
weekly wages at the time of the injury so long as such 
disability is total, but not more than a maximum of 
100% of the state average weekly wage at the time of 
the injury per week and not less than a minimum of 
$45 per week plus $5 for a dependent spouse and $5 
for each dependent child under the age of 18 years, up 
to a IPPXJT""™ of four such dependent children, not to 
exceed the average weekly wage of the employee at 
the time of the injury, but not to exceed 100% of the 
state average weekly wage at the time of the injury 
per week. In no case shall such compensation benefits 
exceed 312 weeks at the rate of 100% of the state 
average weekly wage at the time of the injury over a 
period of eight years from the date of the injury. 
In the event a light duty medical release is ob-
tained prior to the employee reaching a fixed state of 
recovery, and when no such light duty employment it 
available to the employee from the employer, tempo-
rary disability benefits shall continue to be paid. 
(2) The "state average weekly wage" as referred to 
in Chapters 1 and 2 of this title shall be determined 
by the commission as follows: on or before June 1 of 
each year, the total wages reported on contribution 
reports to the department of employment security un-
der the commission for the preceding calendar year 
shall be divided by the average monthly number of 
insured workers determined by dividing the total in-
sured workers reported for the preceding year by 
twelve. The average annual wage thus obtained shall 
be divided by 52, and the average weekly wage thus 
determined rounded to the nearest dollar. The state 
average weekly wage as so determined shall be used 
as the basis for computing the maximum compensa-
tion rate for injuries or disabilities arising from occu-
pational disease which occurred during the twelve-
month period commencing July 1 following the June 
1 determination, and any death resulting therefrom. 
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35-1-65.1. Temporary partial disability — 
Amount of payments. 
(1) If the injury causes temporary partial disability 
for work, the employee shall receive weekly compen-
sation equal to: 
(a) 662/3% of the difference between the em-
ployee's average weekly wages before the acci-
dent and the weekly wages the employee is able 
to earn after the accident, but not more than 
100% of the state average weekly wage at the 
time of injury, plus 
(b) $5 for a dependent spouse and $5 for each 
dependent child under the age of 18 years, up to a 
maximum of four such dependent children, but 
only up to a total weekly compensation that does 
not exceed 100% of the state average weekly 
wage at the time of injury. 
(2) The commission may make an sward for tempo-
rary partial disability for work at any time prior to 
eight years after the date of the injury to an em-
ployee: 
(a) whose physical condition resulting from 
the injury is not finally healed and fixed eight 
years after the date of injury; and 
(b) who files an application for hearing under 
Section 35-1-99. 
(3) The duration of weekly payments may not ex-
ceed 312 weeks nor continue more than eight years 
after the date of the injury. Payments shall terminate 
when the disability ends or the injured employee dies. 
isss 
35-1-66. Permanent partial disability — Scale of 
payments. 
An employee who sustained a permanent impair-
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